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Repositioning the Korea Brand                         
to a Global Audience:
Challenges, Pitfalls, and Current Strategy
by Keith Dinnie
During the past decade there has been growing academic interest in the 
ﬁ eld of nation branding.1 It is increasingly common for governments to 
adopt the techniques of brand management in order to raise their country’s 
proﬁ le or to correct image deﬁ cits that may be detrimental to the nation’s 
standing in the world. Korea has been at the forefront of this surge of inter-
est in the potential of nation branding. Driven largely by a desire to reposi-
tion the Korea brand away from negative association with North Korean 
brinkmanship and lingering images of the Korean War,2 the government of 
South Korea has committed signiﬁ cant resources and energy to position 
the Korea brand as a vibrant dynamic democracy, creative and open to the 
world. Whether this attempted repositioning of the Korea brand will be 
successful remains to be seen. The current raft of nation-branding activities 
initiated and coordinated by the recently established Presidential Council 
on Nation Branding will need to deliver tangible outcomes within the next 
two to three years; otherwise the initial enthusiasm will dissipate, political 
support will dwindle, and inertia will set in.
Although it has been suggested that Spain is one country that has success-
fully managed a trajectory that is in some ways similar to South Korea’s, 
namely the transition from internal conﬂ ict and dictatorship to a more open 
and conﬁ dent cosmopolitanism, it has not been proven that global percep-
tions of this transition have been inﬂ uenced by the skillful application of 
nation-branding techniques or whether the repositioning of the Spain brand 
derives simply as a consequence of the reality of that nation changing in the 
post-Franco era.3 Although the changing reality of Spain does seem to have 
registered in the perceptions of people outside Spain, there appears to be a 
strong feeling among South Korean policymakers that the changing reality 
of Korea has not translated into more positive perceptions of Korea among 
global audiences. Perceptions of Korea thus appear to lag behind reality. 
The barometer of public opinion most frequently cited in this respect is the 
Anholt/GfK Roper Nation Brands Index, in which Korea’s relatively lowly 
standing compared with the size of its economy is taken as evidence of the 
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weakness of the Korea brand. Thus, what can Korean policymakers hope 
to achieve by embracing the techniques of nation branding?
Given the relatively recent emergence of nation branding as a ﬁ eld of aca-
demic study, to date the concept of nation branding shows little theoretical 
underpinning. There is therefore a dearth of frameworks or templates upon 
which Korean policymakers can draw. One convincing and erudite argument 
suggests that nation branding has been in existence for centuries and that it 
is merely the language that we use to describe it that has changed.4 Yet, in 
terms of research and theory building, the concept of nation branding is still 
in its infancy. One of the few conceptualizations of nation branding deﬁ nes 
it as “the strategic self-presentation of a country with the aim of creating 
reputational capital through economic, political and social interest promo-
tion at home and abroad.”5 The focus on self-presentation and promotion 
derives from a public relations perspective and emphasizes the importance 
for a nation to actively manage its reputation rather than passively allowing 
external parties to impose their own brand onto the nation. Nation branding 
may thus be conceived as a form of self-defense in which countries seek to 
tell their own stories rather than be deﬁ ned by foreign media, rival nations, 
or the perpetuation of national stereotypes.6
The goals commonly associated with nation branding include export 
promotion,7 the attraction of foreign investment,8 tourism promotion,9 and 
more intangibly an increase in the inﬂ uence of the nation in world affairs. 
Although the ﬁ rst three goals lend themselves readily to the application 
of conventional branding techniques from the business sector, the goal of 
building the nation’s inﬂ uence is often situated within the domain of public 
diplomacy and soft-power promotion.10 Although nation branding and public 
diplomacy share similar goals with regard to enhancing a nation’s image, 
the fact that they emanate from different academic disciplines has resulted 
in a signiﬁ cant lack of conceptual integration. To a large extent, the origins 
of nation branding lie in business, whereas the roots of public diplomacy lie 
in international relations; and within the academic arena the two disciplines 
rarely meet. This will no doubt change as interest in both nation branding 
and public diplomacy continues to grow.
Several obstacles to integration will need to be overcome. A key barrier to 
the integration of the concepts and disciplines of nation branding and public 
diplomacy is simply a question of terminology. The language of branding sits 
uneasily within the rareﬁ ed atmosphere of many countries’ embassies and 
foreign ministries. The concept of public diplomacy is far from universally 
embraced by ambassadors and other diplomats, many of whom prefer the 
diplomatic function to remain in the realm of discreet ofﬁ cial channels rather 
than the vulgarity of pandering to the masses in foreign countries. Hostility 
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to the concept of nation branding may be even more visceral, with nation 
branding being perceived as an unwelcome intrusion of crass commercialism 
and unworthy of diplomatic resources. To overcome such hostility it may be 
necessary to alter the term “nation branding” to a less provocative one such 
as “national reputation management” or “competitive identity.”11
Alternatively, governments may need to focus more attention on stakeholder 
analysis in order to determine which stakeholders should be included in the 
country’s nation-branding strategy. The dominant view at present mandates 
that all potential stakeholders should be included in the formulation and im-
plementation of nation-branding strategy; however, such a view may prove to 
be naive and ineffective given the challenges of coordination that ﬂ ow from 
a fully inclusive approach. It will be interesting to observe the evolution of 
Korea’s Presidential Council on Nation Branding during the coming years, 
in terms of which stakeholders go on to play an active role, which stakeholders 
provide only a token presence, and which stakeholders withdraw.
Because governments around the world have embraced nation branding 
only within the past few years, as yet few if any templates or models of 
best practice exist for other nations to follow. Korea may establish such 
best practice through its current initiatives if the present momentum can 
be sustained.
Challenges
Branding a nation is a politically sensitive undertaking. It encompasses is-
sues of national identity that can be controversial and difﬁ cult to manage. 
The demise of the UK government’s attempt to rebrand the nation under 
what became known as the “Cool Britannia” campaign serves as a warning 
to other governments of the potentially hostile reactions that may greet any 
ofﬁ cial attempt to manipulate a country’s image. In the case of Korea, as 
for most other nations, a key challenge for policymakers is to successfully 
manage the country’s reputation through projecting an authentic and cultur-
ally grounded image of the nation in such a way that domestic audiences do 
not feel excluded. One academic observer notes that oversensitivity about 
identity can be problematic in Korea and suggests that “a solution cannot 
be found by pretending that national identity does not matter; a solution 
must rest on some kind of compromise highlighting elements of identity that 
serve urgent goals.”12 This may be viewed as one of the most challenging 
aspects of nation branding: distilling the vastness of national identity into 
something that is relevant and communicable to speciﬁ c audiences.
One of the major challenges that Korean policymakers have set for them-
selves is to reduce or even eliminate the so-called Korea discount, which 
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refers to the belief that the “Made in Korea” marque carries less prestige 
and status than other countries of origin such as “Made in Japan” or “Made 
in Germany.” As a consequence, many Koreans believe it is not possible 
for Korean producers to enjoy the same price premiums as those enjoyed 
by producers from more highly regarded origin countries. By taking on the 
challenge of reducing the Korea discount, policymakers have set the bar 
high. Very few nations can hope to compete with the likes of Japan and 
Germany in certain product categories. Furthermore, the Korea discount 
is only a discount when viewed in relation to the top-ranking nations; by 
changing the frame of reference to include less prestigious provenances, 
the Korea discount would transform into a “Korea premium.” Deeper 
analysis will need to be conducted to ascertain the exact dimensions of 
the Korea discount, the ﬁ ndings of which can be incorporated into future 
nation-branding planning.
Many nations suffer from speciﬁ c negative images of which they would like 
to rid themselves. However, policymakers should be cautious in assuming 
that they themselves know what these negative images are. Politicians fre-
quently assume that domestic political events and incidents are familiar to 
external audiences when in reality external audiences neither know nor care 
about such events and incidents. In the context of Korea, the negative im-
ages that cause concern to policymakers revolve around corruption, violent 
street demonstrations, and the behavior of North Korea. The behavior of 
North Korea is relayed to the rest of the world and impinges on perceptions 
of South Korea, in line with research that suggests that “the public learns 
the relative importance of issues from the amount of coverage given to the 
issues in the news media.”13 It is less certain, however, whether external 
audiences are concerned by or even aware of domestic issues such as street 
demonstrations and corruption.
Relevant research in selected target markets is required to verify outsid-
ers’ perceptions; ofﬁ cials cannot rely on assumptions about what foreign 
audiences perceive Korea to be. Qualitative research techniques, such as 
brand association, can be useful in this respect. Brand association research 
into Korea’s image could consist of asking a simple, open-ended question: 
“What comes to your mind when you hear the word Korea?” When this 
question was posed to an internationally diverse group of university students 
in Tokyo earlier this year, sample responses included:
Spicy food. Not so far from Japan.
Military. Korean actors.
Movie industry on the rise. Electronics, Korean BBQ, plastic surgery.
People get mad easily.
Politicians ﬁ ght with their ﬁ sts.
22151_095-104.indd   98 3/10/2010   4:07:24 PM
99Repositioning the Korea Brand to a Global Audience
Samsung, Hyundai, kimchi.
Technologically strong. Friendly people. Tied to their roots.
Spicy food. Small area, separated in North and South.
Challenge to the world.
Samsung, Hyundai, LG. 2002 World Cup.
Very Asian but different from Japan or China. Korea is very friendly  
 and positive to me. Kind people. Interesting culture. Delicious  
 food. Pretty women. Korean War. North Korea is bad: South  
 Korea is good.
A range of potentially useful insights can be drawn from the application 
of qualitative research techniques such as this. The research should be 
conducted in whichever countries or regions Korea is attempting to build 
its brand, as responses from any one region cannot be generalized to other 
regions. Perceptions of Korea within European countries, for example, 
will likely be very different from perceptions of Korea within neighboring 
countries in Asia.
Among the most intriguing challenges for the Korea brand is to ﬁ nd ways 
in which the Korean nation brand can beneﬁ t from the esteem in which 
some of its major corporate brands are held. Samsung, Hyundai, and LG 
are highly respected global brands, yet they downplay their Korean origins, 
perhaps a manifestation of the Korea discount alluded to earlier. Whereas 
Japanese corporate brands such as Sony, Toyota, Mitsubishi, and Toshiba 
appear to have made a huge contribution to the enhancement of Japan’s 
nation brand, Korea does not appear to have beneﬁ ted from this transfer-
ence of brand equity from corporation to nation. Creative ways need to be 
found to ensure that Korea receives due recognition as being the country 
of origin of Samsung and the other global corporate brands. Particularly 
in the electronics sector, there is always a risk that consumers in foreign 
markets will assume that a brand is Japanese even if in reality it is not; an 
apparently high percentage of U.S. consumers believe, for example, that 
Nokia is a Japanese brand. One way in which Korean corporations can and 
do contribute to Korea’s nation branding is through the provision of their 
marketing and branding expertise to organizations such as the Presidential 
Council on Nation Branding.
Pitfalls
Many pitfalls await governments that are embarking on nation-branding 
campaigns, projects, and strategies. Chief among these is the allure of 
expensive but ephemeral advertising campaigns. Although the role of ad-
vertising can be an important element in a country’s overall nation-branding 
strategy,14 it should not be regarded as sufﬁ cient in itself. A comprehensive 
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and coherent nation-branding strategy must go beyond advertising and ad-
dress fundamental issues, including the coordination of different government 
departments and ministries, the establishment of productive public-sector–
private-sector partnerships, and the allocation of sufﬁ cient resources to the 
often overlooked importance of diaspora mobilization.
An obsession with slogans is often manifest in different countries’ nation-
branding initiatives. In the case of Korea, slogans such as “Dynamic Korea” 
and “Korea Sparkling” have been used recently, and new slogans are being 
planned. Although such slogans have a role to play in Korea’s branding, 
they are no substitute for intelligent coordination of different stakeholders 
and substantive improvement of the nation’s capabilities, whether in terms 
of being a good location for business, study, or visiting.
A further problem with slogans resides in their transitory nature: each time 
there is a change of government within any country, the incoming admin-
istration almost inevitably cancels the previous slogan or campaign and 
replaces it with a new and not necessarily better one. There is also little 
if any publicly available evidence of the effectiveness of nation-branding 
image campaigns based on advertising and slogans.
A further pitfall to be avoided is the “siloitis” that commonly afﬂ icts large 
corporations but that can also occur between government departments and 
ministries. Lack of communication between government organizations can 
result in wasteful duplication of resources and failure to capitalize on poten-
tial synergies. In some countries, the national tourism organization (NTO) 
has for so long been the only body charged with promoting the country’s 
image that the NTO may come to believe that it does not need to collaborate 
with inward investment or trade promotion. In such cases, leadership needs 
to be exercised by senior government ﬁ gures to ensure that these different 
functions are collaborating or, at a minimum, are exploring the possibility 
of future cooperation. In Tokyo, for instance, the inward investment agency 
and the NTO of a leading European nation have signed a memorandum of 
understanding in which they agree to explore possible synergies in their 
activities in the Japanese market.
Although “country image” is a commonly used term, it should in reality 
appear in the plural as countries do not have one single image but rather a 
multitude of context-dependent images. It would be a mistake for Korea to 
attempt to project a single global image; instead, there should be custom-
ized campaigns for speciﬁ c target audiences. Fundamentally, this could be 
fashioned at a minimum of three levels—peninsular, regional (Northeast 
Asia), and global. However, the selected strategies should be developed 
according to the speciﬁ c objectives that are set for each level. A lack of 
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such adaptation of strategy in favor of a clumsy monolithic approach can 
backﬁ re, as was seen in Australia’s controversial tourism branding campaign 
that made use of the slogan, “Where the bloody hell are you?” In the UK 
market the campaign was received moderately favorably, but in Japan it was 
perceived as rude, aggressive, and inappropriate. Corporations are familiar 
with the standardization-versus-adaptation argument within international 
marketing, but most nations have not acquired expertise in this concept as 
applied to their nation brand.
Current Strategy
In August 2008 President Lee Myung-bak announced plans to establish a 
nation-branding committee. This set in motion a ﬂ urry of activity, including 
numerous articles in the Korean media on the topic of nation branding, an 
ongoing public debate, visits by foreign experts, and conferences in Seoul. 
On 22 January 2009 council chairman Euh Yoon-dae ofﬁ cially launched 
Korea’s current nation-branding program under the auspices of the newly 
created Presidential Council on Nation Branding. The council comprises 47 
members, 16 of whom are senior government ﬁ gures while 31 are from vari-
ous private-sector backgrounds. As a former president of Korea University, 
Euh Yoon-dae is widely credited with the successful internationalization 
of that institution, and he aspires to bring a similar global outlook to the 
branding of South Korea. The Presidential Council on Nation Branding is 
structured into ﬁ ve teams that have been allocated responsibility for inter-
national cooperation, corporate and information technology, culture and 
tourism, the global community, and overall coordination.
The details of Korea’s nation branding strategy have been summarized in 
the form of a 10-point action plan:
Promote tae kwon do;•
Dispatch 3,000 volunteers abroad each year;•
Adopt a “Korean wave” program;•
Introduce the Global Korea scholarship;•
Adopt the Campus Asia program;•
Increase external aid;•
Develop state-of-the-art technologies;•
Nurture the culture and tourism industries;•
Treat foreigners and multicultural families better; and•
Help Koreans become “global citizens.”•
The plan is ambitious and wide-ranging and is to be commended for its 
focus on tangible activities and active global citizenship rather than merely 
on marketing and advertising campaigns. The soft-power component of the 
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strategy is particularly strong through the emphasis on increasing external 
aid, thus clearly signaling Korea’s transition from aid recipient to aid do-
nor. The social trends within South Korean society that have formed the 
basis for this increase in overseas development assistance are identiﬁ ed by 
Lumsdaine and Shopf, who posit:
[A] recent rise in voluntarism, the expanded political inﬂ uence 
of NGOs, and strong popular support for assistance to the poor, 
both at home and abroad, signal a shift in civic values. . . . Korean 
foreign assistance policy, then, shows great promise, and has the 
potential to serve as a model for newly developed countries, while 
providing Korea with lasting prestige.16
Another facet of Korea’s foreign assistance policy is World Friends Korea, 
roughly equivalent to the U.S. Peace Corps. The Presidential Council on 
Nation Branding will play a coordinating role through its oversight of the 
various volunteer programs that government agencies have traditionally 
operated. Volunteers will be tasked with promoting Korea’s culture and food 
around the world as well as working in areas such as information technology, 
education, and the environment. The spread of Korean culture—the Korean 
wave—is considered by policymakers to represent an important dimension of 
the country’s soft power. Although soft power has been considered difﬁ cult 
to measure, the economic beneﬁ ts can sometimes be directly observable, as 
in the inﬂ ux of Japanese tourists to Korea following the screening of Korean 
soap operas on Japanese television.
Korean policymakers, like their counterparts in other nations, need to grapple 
with the issue of measuring the effectiveness of their nation-branding strat-
egy. This is an area in which most nations are weak and need to quickly 
learn lessons from the business sector. It is rare to ﬁ nd rigorous strategy 
evaluation systems in place for nation-branding projects. There can also be 
a lack of communication of the strategy, whereby nation-branding strategy 
is formulated domestically but then followed by a failure to communicate 
that strategy effectively to organizations and individuals on the ground in 
foreign countries. Governments need to ensure that their countries’ networks 
of ofﬁ ces for investment attraction, trade promotion, and tourism are all 
aware of and buy into the strategy that has been formulated. This is a key 
role that Korea’s Presidential Council on Nation Branding will need to as-
sume if the good intentions of the formulated nation-branding strategy are 
to become reality.
For evaluation of the effectiveness of the strategy, responsibility has been 
delegated to the Samsung Economic Research Institute to develop a measure-
ment system that will capture the multidimensionality of nation-branding 
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policy. If such a system is developed successfully, that in itself will represent 
a major contribution by Korea to the ﬁ eld of nation branding in addition to the 
many positive elements of the strategy already announced and initiated.
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